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ABSTRACT
Victims of Their Own Reluctance: A Legal Analysis of the United
States and the Mine Ban Treaty
Ashley Flood
Director: Timothy Schorn, J.D., Ph. D.
This paper offers a legal analysis of the United States’ failure to join the 1997 Mine Ban
Treaty under the parameters of the Law of Armed Conflict. The Law of Armed Conflict
sets forth the four basic principles that govern the actions in warfare while the Mine Ban
Treaty prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. As
civilians and children are falling victim to landmines every day, the International
Committee of the Red Cross pushed for an international policy change that would help
the humanitarian assistance as well as place an outright ban on an entire class of
weapons. As most of the world’s countries have signed the Mine Ban Treaty, this paper
questions the legality of the United States’ failure to do so under the four basic principles
of the Law of Armed Conflict. After a discussion of the applicable law pertaining to
landmines and an expansion of the four principles, this paper concludes that the United
States is in violation of the Law of Armed Conflicts and recommends that it sign the
Mine Ban Treaty.

KEWWORDS: Landmines, Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa Convention, Laws of Armed
Conflict, Proportionality, Distinction, Military Necessity, Unnecessary Suffering
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

In January 2018, a vehicle in Mali ran over a landmine killing a total of twentyfour individuals, including four babies and their respective mothers.1
On December 24, 2017, another landmine in Afghanistan detonated when a
vehicle drove over it, killing seven civilians and wounding three.2
On August 9, 2016, in Yemen, eleven civilians, seven of whom were children –
two under the age of four, were killed by an antivehicle mine.3
In Cambodia, a country with a significant number of landmines, fifty percent of
landmine casualties are children, as reported by the Cambodian Red Cross.4
This number increases in Somalia where children account for more than 55
percent of the victims as stated in the 2003 Landmine Impact Survey.5
The alarming statistics of landmine casualties eventually led to the inception of
the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty “on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production, and
transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction.”6 Answering a public outcry to

Bamako, “‘Terrorist’ landmine kills 24 civilians officials say,” Daily Sabah Africa, (January 2018),
https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2018/01/25/terrorist-landmine-kills-24-civilians-in-mali-local-officialssay, (accessed February 2018).
2
Landmine kills 7 civilians in Afghanistan, Egypt Today, (December 2017),
http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/38200/Landmine-kills-7-civilians-in-Afghanistan, (accessed
February 2018).
3
“Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims,” Human Rights Watch, (September 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims, (accessed February
2018).
4
Children and Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, UNICEF,
https://www.unicef.org/french/protection/files/Landmines_Factsheet_04_LTR_HD.pdf, (accessed February
2018).
5
Children and Landmines: A Deadly Legacy.
6
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction,” opened for signature December 1997, International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, http://icbl.org/media/604037/treatyenglish.pdf.
1
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the disturbing death toll, the treaty outright bans a weapon system that has been
systematically and extensively used across the globe.7 A conjunction of humanitarian
assistance and arms control, the treaty is a combination of both international governments
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) coming together to push for an international
ban on a weapon that indiscriminately detonates, maiming thousands of civilians and
children. Gaining the attention of the international community, the Mine Ban Treaty was
successful in securing more than 80% of the world’s countries as signing parties.8 Yet, as
an international powerhouse, the United States (U.S.) to date has failed to sign the treaty.
A party to the world’s first treaty regarding landmines – Amended Protocol II to
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the U.S. claims to be at the forefront
of the global outcry against the use of landmines, but continues to be a minority in the
international community.9 The U.S. 2007 policy regarding landmines states:
“POLICY: The military capabilities provided by landmines remain necessary for
the United States to protect its armed forces and ensure the success of their
mission. The United States is also committed to eliminating the humanitarian
risks posed by all land-mines – both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle. It stands with
those who seek to protect innocent civilians from these weapons. However, the
United States has not signed the Ottawa Convention [the Mine Ban Treaty]
because it fails to balance legitimate military requirement with humanitarian
concerns.”10
The U.S. attributes their reluctance to the treaty’s failure “to balance legitimate military
requirement with humanitarian concerns,”11 yet their reasoning is not legitimate in the
international community or even within the U.S. community itself. Several high-ranking

Kenneth Anderson, “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society,” EJIL 11, no. 1 (2000), 92.
8
Treaty Status, International Campaign To Ban Landmines, (2018), http://icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treatystatus.aspx (accessed February 2018).
9
“U.S. Policy Regarding Landmines,” The American Journal of International Law 102, no. 1 (January
2008), 190.
10
Ibid, 190.
11
Ibid, 190.
7
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U.S. military officials have repeatedly refuted the military utility of landmines making
them irrelevant to the U.S. military requirements.
Based on the faulty reasoning that the U.S. stands by for its failure to join the
1997 Mine Ban Treaty, this paper is questioning the legality of the U.S. position under
the Law of Armed Conflict. Is the U.S. in Violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict based
upon its inherent principles by not being a state party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty? Yes.
Considering the inherent nature of the weapon, landmines in and of themselves violate
the four principles. Therefore, the U.S. is in violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict as it
fails to be a signing party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While the U.S. is not a signatory
party to the Mine Ban Treaty, they are also not in violation to the treaty; however, the
U.S. is in violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict based upon its willingness to use
landmines. Thus, the U.S. should ratify the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty because it would give
them the authority and credibility in the international community, while providing a set of
guidelines for the nation to follow. This paper then argues that the United States is in
violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict and recommends that they should be a signing
party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
Although the U.S. failed to sign the treaty, they have contributed an extensive
amount of money to the humanitarian assistance efforts.12 However, this was not until
after the ICRC surgeons acted against the horrific weapon taking thousands of innocent
victims around the world. According to UNICEF, “children account for one in every five
landmine victims.”13 Each and every day more and more individuals are dying at the
result of landmines around the world – one person every twenty-two minutes has fallen

12
13

Ibid, 191.
Children and Landmines: A Deadly Legacy.
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victim to a landmine globally since 1996.14 During the mid-1990’s, “over 130 states
stockpiled landmines and landmines killed or injured an estimated 20,000 to 30,000
people every year;”15 (see Figure 1 for updated statistics). The International Committee
of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) team of surgeons witnessed the detrimental effects of
landmines firsthand when tending to “mine-inflicted wounds, deaths, and trauma in
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique.”16 Surgeons of the ICRC feared the
alarming increase of limb amputations on landmine victims during the 1980s and in
response to this, initiated an international campaign to ban landmines.17

Figure 118

Anne Theodore Briggs, “Proceed With Caution: U.S. Policy Toward a Global Ban on Landmines,”
Human Rights Brief, (1999), 1.
15
Rachel Good, “Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its Policy Toward the 1997 Mine Ban
Treaty,” Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights, (2011), 1.
16
Ramesh Thakur & William Maley, “The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian
Treaty in Arms Control?” Global Governance 5 (1999), 283.
17
Anderson, 104.
18
Figure 1: “Landmine Monitor 2017,” International Committee to Ban Landmines – Custer Munition
Coalition, (December 2017), http://the-monitor.org/media/2615219/Landmine-Monitor-2017_final.pdf,
(accessed April 2018), 52; I acknowledge that these statistics incorporate explosive remnants of war
(EPW), but due to scope and limitations of my research, these numbers represent an accurate estimate of
the number of victims affected by landmines. I also acknowledge that these statistics only account for the
known number of causalities, i.e. those reported.
14
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Bringing this humanitarian issue to light, the surgeons depicted the evidence in
graphic photos and videos, and paired with the language of the law, the ICRC surgeons
were successful in showing that “landmines were causing ‘superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering.’”19 This “occurred as the result of a co-ordinated grassroots
strategy that mobilized a succession of powerful images and messages that were designed
to stir and awake, alarm and outrage, inspire and mobilize the public into action.”20
Gaining the attention of international NGOs, the ICRC initiated what later became known
as the Ottawa Process.21 “By bringing the plight of the most vulnerable victims of war to
the attention of the media and public opinion around the world,”22 NGOs were at the
forefront of a global campaign to ban landmines.23
In October of 1992, there was an organized meeting in New York City at the
Empire State Building involving six different non-governmental organizations all with
the same agenda – “to develop a strategy for achieving a worldwide ban on landmines.”24
Coming from a variety of standpoints yet still concerned about the current issue, the
Handicap International of France, Human Rights Watch of the U.S., Medico International
of Germany, Mines Awareness Group of the United Kingdom, Physicians for Human
Rights of the U.S., and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation gathered for an initial
meeting.25 At the conclusion of this meeting, the International Campaign to Ban

19

Thakur & Maley, 283.
Maxwell A. Carmen, Robert J. Lawson, & Brian W. Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear: The Global
Movement to Ban Landmines, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14.
21
Anderson, 104; Trevor Findlay, “Verification of the Ottawa Convention: Workable Hybrid or Fatal
Compromise?” Disarmament Forum (1999), 49.
22
Cameron, Lawson, & Tomlin, 5.
23
Anderson, 104-105.
24
Good, 1.
25
Anderson, 105.
20
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Landmines (ICBL) was born.26 Although the ICRC, the mediator in this entire process,
did not join the ICBL, it fully supported the cause and was merely limited by its own
mandates and thus unable to join.27 Over the course of the next few years, this diverse
group of NGOs came together to expand the ICBL to more than 1,200 different NGOs
which included more than 60 countries.28 Amongst this group of NGOs, there were
differing ideas about what the issue really was – some regarded this as a humanitarian
law issue while others viewed it as medical issue, or even as a social issue.29 Either way,
these NGOs came together to initiate the Ottawa Process that eventually led to the
December 1997 signing of the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa, Canada.30
Prior to the signing of the treaty, there was a long process of negotiations and
meetings that took place. “Prominent media outlets increasingly recognized the
compelling story behind the global humanitarian crisis,”31 and as soon as countries
realized the complexity of the landmine issue, sympathetic governments began to initiate
individual laws and restrictions on the use and export of landmines in their respective
countries.32 As the support for the ICBL continued to grow, most of the state parties were
small to medium world powers,33 that included the Nordic countries and Canada.34 These
small to medium powers began to see this landmine campaign “as an important
counterweight to the political hegemony of the United States.”35 This view of the U.S.

26

Ibid, 105.
Ibid, 105.
28
Ibid, 105.
29
Ibid, 105.
30
Ibid, 108.
31
Cameron, Lawson, & Tomlin, 23.
32
Anderson, 106.
33
Findlay, 49
34
Anderson, 107.
35
Ibid,107.
27
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may have influenced the lesser NATO power Canada to be the driving state force that the
ICBL needed to initiate a political and legal process to ban landmines.36 The Canadian
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy proclaimed:
“The need for new partnerships to address global problems and the increased
power wielded by a wide range of state and non-state actors intersected in the
landmines campaign . . . it brought together a mixed group of players into a
coalition without precedent . . . The landmines campaign was the harbinger of the
new multilateralism: new alliances among states, new partnerships with non-state
actors, and new approaches to international governance.”37
Therefore, in December of 1996, acknowledging a request from the Canadian Foreign
Minister Lloyd Axworthy to eliminate or limit the use of landmines, the ICBL in
conjunction with a “core group” of states, (Canada, Norway, Austria, South Africa, and
Belgium),38 began negotiations to build a treaty in 1996.39 The first planning meeting,
held in Ottawa, Canada, was for states that would support a complete ban of antipersonnel landmines.40 The conference, “called ‘Towards a Global Ban on AntiPersonnel Mines,’ . . . brought representatives of over 50 countries and 24 observer states
to discuss a strategy for achieving a ban.”41 This is also where Canadian Foreign Minister
Axworthy “made the surprise, radical announcement that Canada would hold a treaty
signing ceremony a mere year later.”42
Once this announcement was made, the global community went to work. Through
a “series of regional symposia and workshops”43 in the international community, the
ICBL and its acting NGOs were able to gain a larger group of state support that would

36

Ibid, 108.
Ibid, 109.
38
Good, 1; Thakur & Maley, 284.
39
Good, 1.
40
Thakur & Maley, 284.
41
Cameron, Lawson, & Tomlin, 6.
42
Anderson, 108.
43
Thakur & Maley, 284.
37
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help push the global ban.44 Through NGO pressure, governments began to see the
“genuine extent of the problem and put it on their policy agendas”45 and recognized that
“the decision to ban landmines was essentially cost and risk-free.”46 In anticipation of the
treaty-signing, Austria prepared the first draft in February 1997.47 This led to three more
meetings: the first in Vienna from 12-14 February 1997 and the second in Bonn in April
1997, and finally in Brussels in June 1997.48 Final negotiations were then conducted in
Oslo, Canada in September of 1997.49 In these final negotiations, not only were state
actors able to participate, but also the ICBL and ICRC;50 this marked the “successful
entry of international non-governmental organizations into [the] diplomatic and
lawmaking process.”51 This final negotiation process was where the U.S. first participated
in the negotiations of the treaty and listed non-negotiable demands in order for them to be
a signing party.52 The U.S. put forth “five treaty-weakening amendments, . . . which
included 1) a geographic exception for Korea, 2) a waiver for American “mixed mine
systems, 3) an optional nine-year delay period, 4) a treaty opt-out clause, and 5) a
provision permitting countries to sign with reservations.”53 As a complete package, the
proposal was rejected, and thus the U.S. refused to sign.54 Ultimately, the final product
was a mixture of humanitarian assistance measures and an arms control measure to ban

44

Anderson, 109.
Ibid, 107
46
Ibid, 107.
47
Findlay ,50;
48
Ibid, 50; Carmen, Lawson, & Tomlin, 6.
49
Findlay, 51.
50
Anderson, 112.
51
Ibid, 92.
52
Findlay, 51.
53
Holly Burkhalter, “The Mine Ban Treaty,” Foreign Policy in Focus, (2005),
http://fpif.org/the_mine_ban_treaty/, (accessed March 2018).
54
Ibid.
45

8

the use of landmines,55 and became one of “the most significant legal events of the entire
1990s.”56 The finalized product was ready for signatures in December of 1997, only
fourteen months after its initial planning meeting, and became to be known as the Mine
Ban Treaty (MBT), the Ottawa Convention, or the Ottawa Treaty.57 For the purpose of
this paper, the treaty will be hereinafter referred to as the MBT.
This paper offers a legal analysis of the United States failure to comply with and
sign the 1997 MBT, resulting in a violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict. Chapter Two
will review the applicable law pertaining to the use of landmines, specifically the origin
of the MBT and Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons. Chapter Three will then provide a background of the four core principles to the
Laws of Armed Conflict, while Chapter Four will provide a discussion applying the law
to the principles. Based on this discussion, one will conclude that the U.S. is in violation
of the Laws of Armed Conflict as it fails to be a signing party to the 1997 Mine Ban
Treaty.

55

Findlay, 51.
Anderson, 92.
57
Good, 1; Briggs, 1; Thakur & Maley, 273; Anderson, 92.
56
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CHAPTER TWO
The Mine Ban Treaty
The Treaty
As the first treaty to “impose a ban on an entire class of weapons already in
widespread use,”58 the MBT is historically significant for its triumph not only in arms
control, but also for its “unusual coalition of governments.”59 The 1997 MBT, as
published by the ICBL, is the “legally binding international agreement that bans the use,
production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines and places obligations on
countries to clear affected areas, assist victims and destroy stockpiles.”60 Currently with
the 164 state parties, which amounts to more than 80% of the world’s countries,61 the
MBT is “[d]etermined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by
antipersonnel mines.”62 Each of these parties has agreed to the general obligations as
defined in Article 1 of the MBT:
“1.
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a)
To use anti-personnel mines;
b)
To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c)
To assist, encourage or induce in any way, anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2.
Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of
all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention.”63

58

Thakur & Maley, 273.
Ibid, 273.
60
The Treaty, International Campaign To Ban Landmines, http://icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty.aspx (accessed
February 2018).
61
Treaty Status
62
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Preamble.
63
Ibid, Article 1.
59
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Under these obligations, the MBT defines an anti-personnel mine as “a mine designed to
be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate,
injure, or kill one or more persons.”64 However, under this definition, “[m]ines designed
to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person,
that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.”65 Consequently, an anti-handling device is then defined by
the MBT as “a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached
to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with
or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”66 The MBT outlines in its articles additional
exceptions and rules that further explain and regulate the use and destruction of
landmines.
As an international treaty, the MBT is limited to only state parties as signatories,
and the NGOs were successful in ensuring national security measures were upheld in the
writing of the MBT as to satisfy the state parties.67 The ICBL and its partners “called for
a simple, clean, and comprehensive ban on APL [anti-personnel landmines] with no
exception, reservation, or loophole,”68 and they were successful in influencing the state
parties to accept the strict rules regulating the use of landmines.69 State parties to the
MBT have acknowledged the acting role of NGOs in government and “found that much
its work at the country level . . . intimately involves the diverse and dedicated
contributions of [NGOs].”70 The MBT was at the forefront of NGOs moving “from being

64

Ibid, Article 2.
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Thakur & Maley, 280.
68
Ibid, 281.
69
Ibid, 281.
70
Ibid, 282.
65
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service providers and information disseminators to assuming policy-shaping roles in
local, national, and international public policy.”71 Consequently the MBT will set future
precedent for NGOs mediating with state parties to impact global issues and to declare an
international legal change.72 Nonetheless, that does not mean there was not friction in the
negotiations of such a historical treaty.
One area of the MBT that the outliers or non-signatories (United States, Russia,
China etc.)73 wanted to push further on was the verification process.74 Their complaint
was that the MBT “does not establish any verification machinery to ensure compliance
with the ban on production, use, and transfer of mines.”75 Because state parties do not
necessarily rely on a good faith basis, certain states called for a strict verification
process.76 Verification methods could include a variety of approaches ranging “from onsite inspection to satellite imagery, electronic surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, and
other remote technologies.”77 Consequently, with a strict verification process, the MBT
must then outline protections “against costly, politically motivated, malicious, or
frivolous charges”78 that might occur. In addition, the framers of the MBT acknowledged
the widening gap between different parties in relation to the rapid technological
advances.79 The intelligence capabilities of the U.S. per se are far more advanced than
that of developing countries that are a part of the MBT.80 This gives rise to countries
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Ibid, 282.
Ibid, 282.
73
Treaty Status.
74
Thakur & Maley, 282.
75
Ibid, 290.
76
Ibid, 290.
77
Ibid, 290.
78
Ibid, 290.
79
Ibid, 287 & 291.
80
Ibid, 291.
72
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having suspicion of the U.S.; “there is a qualitative discrepancy between the ability of
developing countries and that of the United States to detect possible violations of arms
control agreements that can trigger international inspection.”81 Arms control means are
negotiated between the involved governments and therefore verification problems and
political discrepancies became an inherent difficulty in the writing of the MBT.82 Yet, the
MBT was able to establish a new standard for verification.83 Unpopular with the outliers,
the MBT utilizes a moral compass as a way to regulate its parameters. The MBT, in
Articles 7 and 8, calls for each state party to produce evidence of compliance.84 Thus,
without a moral conscience, “no government, insurgent, or terrorist”85 will be able to
stray from the legal obligations set forth in the MBT. Therefore, “instead of relying on
verification . . . the [MBT] relies on the continued stigmatization”86 of landmines.
Because of this distinct verification process, the MBT ultimately relies on the NGOs to
continue to lead the campaign to ban landmines as “they must stay at the forefront of
‘keeping the bastards honest.’”87 Because of reasons like this, the MBT continues to
separate itself from any arms control or humanitarian assistance treaty in the past.
Although the verification process was not as strict as some would have liked it to
be, the MBT outlines strict supplemental provisions framed within its articles. In the
negotiation process, parties pushed for provisions; for example, the U.S. pushed for
several provisions that would significantly weaken the treaty rendering it ineffective.
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Ibid, 291.
Ibid, 287 & 291.
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Ibid, 291.
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“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction;” Thakur & Maley, 291.
85
Thakur & Maley, 291.
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Ibid, 291.
87
Ibid, 291.
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Though the MBT was not as strict in the verification process, the framers stood firm on
the ground of other requirements of the MBT, which ultimately outlined strict deadlines
and regulations within the articles. While the MBT was ready for signatures in December
of 1997, under Article 17, the entry into force date was not to be until “the first day of the
sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession has been deposited.”88 The fortieth country to ratify the MBT was
Burkina Faso in September 1998, which therefore entered the MBT into force in March
1999.89 Upon the MBT’s entry into force, several other provisions must be completed by
specific dates outlined within individual articles.90 Within four years of the entry into
force date, state parties must destroy all stockpiled anti-personnel mines,91 while all
minefields must be cleared by the state parties under whose jurisdiction they lie within
ten years of the entry into force date.92 Additionally, state parties are required to report all
obligations outlined in Article 7 to the United Nations Secretary-General within 180 days
of the entry into force date.93 As named in Article 21, the depository of the convention,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations,94 is required to hold a review conference
five years after the MBT entered into force, yet additional review conferences after the
first are permissive.95 For parties that have signed the MBT after the 40th signatory, the

“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Article 17(1).
89
Thakur & Maley, 295.
90
Thakur & Maley, 295-296; “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.”
91
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Article 4.
92
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Article 5; Thakur & Maley, 296.
93
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Article 7; Thakur & Maley, 296.
94
“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Article 21.
95
Thakur & Maley, 296.
88
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individual entry into force date will be the respective date six months after the party’s
acceptance or ratification.96 Additionally, Article 20 outlines the “Duration and
withdrawal”97 of state parties:
“2.
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right
to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other State Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council.
Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons
motivating this withdrawal.
3.
Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the
instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that sixmonth period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the
withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.”98
While the above articles give very specific instructions as to the dates and directives
guiding the state parties’ actions, Article 3 of the MBT offers a vague interpretation for
each of the state parties; this article allows for parties to have “a number of antipersonnel mines”99 (emphasis added) for training purposes, but does specify a limit as the
“amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for
the above-mentioned purposes.”100
Even with the MBT’s generally strict regulations, the MBT’s has afforded several
successes and challenges since its inception. Once the MBT created a framework that
incorporated arms control and humanitarian assistance efforts, it has become the standard
that other instruments have followed, such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions.101
The NGOs policing the different state parties to the MBT have only seen, (in 2016), the

“Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction,” Article 17.
97
Ibid, Article 20.
98
Ibid, Article 20.
99
Ibid, Article 3.
100
Ibid, Article 3.
101
What are the current challenges and successes of the Mine Ban Treaty, Landmine & Cluster Munition
Monitor, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/the-issues/faqs/mine-ban-treaty/what-are-the-currentchallenges-and-successes.aspx (accessed March 2018).
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use of antipersonnel landmines in 10 countries, all by non-state armed groups, including
Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.102 Although with a majority of states a
party of the MBT, there are still a few government forces using landmines (in 2016),
including Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria.103 Yet, with the explicit procedures outlined
in the articles of the MBT, “Several State Parties are still facing serious compliance
issues, particularly with respect to missed stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated
mine clearance deadline extensions.”104
For example, the ICBL issued a “Statement on Compliance to the Sixteenth
Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty in Vienna, Austria” in December
2017.105 The statement was delivered by Steve Goose, the Executive Director of the
Arms Division for the ICBL, and he sighted several compliance issues in relation to
individual articles of the MBT.106 Under Article 4, the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines,107 the deadlines were missed by Greece and Ukraine, while according to
Article 3, pertaining to the exceptions of use, the ICBL fails to see why state parties are
abusing this exception.108 According to Goose, state parties “are keeping mines under the
Article 3 exception without ever using them for any of the permitted purposes. These are
in essence stockpiled mines, not mines retained for training or development.”109 Further
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citing compliance issues, Goose mentions under Article 5 “there are far too many mine
clearance extension requests, and too little respect for the “as soon as possible”
requirement and the ten-year deadline.”110 Under Article 7, the transparency measures,111
Goose states “the compliance rate for transparency reporting continues to embarrassingly
low (less than 50% for 2016).”112 Yet, regardless of the compliance issues that a number
of select states have with the
MBT, the treaty has
significantly dropped the
number of instances that antipersonnel landmines have been
used, with most of the known
uses conducted by non-state
armed groups,113 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2114

The impact the MBT115 has had on the international community is significant.
Being the first treaty to ban an entire class of weapons, the collaboration of NGO’s and
government parties set the “new international norm.”116 Regardless of the successes and
challenges the MBT has faced since its entry into force, the MBT was not the first treaty
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regarding the use of landmines. The first international treaty regarding landmines was the
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.117 Although
not banning an entire class of weapons, the Protocol did set legal restrictions on the use
of landmines.
CCW Protocol II
Before the Mine Ban Treaty was ever introduced, attempting to limit the use of
landmines was the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW). The CCW adopted a protocol addressing landmines: “Protocol II to the 1980
Convention as amended on 3 May 1996.”118 Also known as the “Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3
May 1996,”119 this specific protocol outlines the use of mines, booby traps, other devices,
and anti-personnel mines, as well as the restrictions, transfer, removal, and protection
from such devices.120 For the simplicity of this paper, this protocol will be called CCW
Protocol II. This was the first attempt to place restrictions on the use of landmines, and it
ultimately failed. The framers of the CCW Protocol II left gaps in its language which
paved the way for landmines to be used because they were militarily necessary, thus
making the protocol important in this paper’s discussion to see how the MBT does not
allow for such loopholes. Commentators have called CCW Protocol II “weak” and
“ineffectual”121 compared to the MBT. But first, it is important to examine how CCW
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Protocol II defines each of these terms and the language that is used in distinguishing
between the different kinds of mines as compared to the MBT. A mine is simply “a
munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.”122 Under the
MBT, a mine is defined the same as in CCW Protocol II, as is an anti-personnel mine.123
Additionally, an anti-handling device is defined very similar, both the MBT and CCW
Protocol II using interchangeable language in their respective definitions.124 However, the
CCW Protocol II further describes a remotely-delivered mine as “a mine not directly
emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped
from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are
not considered to be “remotely delivered” provided that they are used in accordance with
Article 5125 and other relevant Articles of this Protocol.”126 Under the definition of other
devices, CCW Protocol II includes “manually placed munitions and devices including
improvised explosive devices [IED’s] designed to kill, injure or damage and which are
actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.”127 Whereas,
booby-traps are “any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill
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or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an
apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.”128
Using these definitions, under Article 3 of CCW Protocol II “[i]t is prohibited in
all circumstances to use any mine, booby-trap or other device which is designed or of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”129 Furthermore, “[it] is
prohibited to use mines, booby-traps or other devices which employ a mechanism or
device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly
available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-contact influence
during normal use in detection operations.”130 Article 3 further states many legal and
humanitarian considerations for restricting the use of such devices and states “All feasible
precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this
Article applies,”131 (which includes mines, booby-traps, and other devices), and takes into
account practical precautions such as humanitarian and military considerations.132 Note
that CCW Protocol II only regulates the specific use of landmines, and does not outright
bans the use of landmines altogether, rather just places tight restrictions. Yet, the article
calls for all circumstances to be taken into consideration when assuming certain
precautions and specifies examples of such.133 However, Article 3 does not limit the
considerations to only the examples it includes, such as the “possible measures to protect
civilians,” and “the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.”134 Thus,
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this leaves an open-ended loophole in CCW Protocol II as it accounts for the military
considerations, whereas the MBT does not.
For the purpose of this paper, the definition of an anti-personnel mine will
adopted from the MBT - “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or
contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines
designated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that
are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines a result
of being so equipped.”135 Thus the definition of anti-personnel mine does not include
those equipped with an anti-handling device that are designed to be detonated by a
vehicle. Anti-handling device will be defined as “a device intended to protect a mine and
which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when
an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”136 For
simplicity, an anti-personnel landmine will be hereinafter referred to as a landmine unless
otherwise specified within the context of this paper.
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CHAPTER THREE
Law of Armed Conflict: The Four Principles
Landmines are considered a class of weapons, and all weapon systems used in
warfare are regulated under their applicable treaty law as well as under the principles of
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).137 Thus, one must examine the “means and
methods”138 of the use of landmines. LOAC “addresses two interrelated areas: (1) the
methods of warfare; that is tactics or how we go about fighting; and (2) the means of
warfare, that is what instruments of war we use to fight.”139 Therefore, to understand the
legality of the use of landmines, one must understand both the treaty law and the rules
dictated by LOAC.
LOAC “is the principal body of law governing the legitimacy of military
actions,”140 and “describes those international rules governing the conduct of hostilities
and punishable acts therein.”141 LOAC is guided by four fundamental principles: military
necessity, distinction, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality.142 This paper
acknowledges that these four principles are significantly interrelated, and accepts that
there will be consistent overlap within this chapter and for the duration of this paper. The
terms of LOAC, the Laws of War, and International Humanitarian Law are often
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interchangeable; this is also acknowledged and this paper will hereinafter refer to it as
LOAC.143
Military Necessity
The principle of military necessity relies on a legitimate military objective and
can be traced back to the principles origins. Initially, the military necessity principle was
referred to as the idea of all means necessary to win and derives from two different
standards.144 Going back to the nineteenth century, the law regulating armed conflict
simply recommended that a state “could do all that was necessary to ensure its survival
and achieve military victory.”145 In the twentieth century, the principle of military
necessity now expressed humanitarian considerations.146 This broad transition was
solidified by the outcome at a Nuremburg trial in which German defendants attempted to
use the “military necessity” defense.147 In these instances, the defense was rejected,148
and traditionally has been rejected under the belief that LOAC was “crafted to include
consideration of military necessity.”149 In its decision, the Tribunal refocused the scope of
military necessity, and it now took into consideration the legitimacy of the force being
used to obtain the military objective.150 This brings forward one very important
component of military necessity: a legitimate military objective.
If an action is deemed militarily necessary, then the acting party must determine if
the target is a legitimate military objective.151 Under the 1977 Protocol Additional to the
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Geneva Conventions, Protocol I, (herein after referred to as Geneva Protocol I) Article
52(2), “military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.”152 To understand this definition, the phrase “objects by
which their nature, location, purpose, or use”153 needs to be further broken down. Objects
by their nature refers to the objects in the natured used by an armed force become a
military objective, such as a tank.154 The location of an object refers to those objects by
their location are “of special importance for military operations.”155 The purpose of an
object refers to the intended use of the object, while the use of said object indicates its
present function.156 Once identifying an legitimate object under those parameters (by
their nature, location, purpose, or use), the object then must offer a military advantage for
it to be a legitimate military objective. As stated in the Commentary of Geneva Protocol
I, “there must be a definite military advantage for every military objective that is
attacked.”157 Additionally, “the military advantage which should also be concrete and
direct must be weighed against the civilian losses and damage which could result from an
attack.”158 In other words, military necessity is the “rule which allows a soldier engaged
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in armed conflict to take life and destroy property but constrains that conduct in
circumstances where no military advantage exists.”159
In determining a military objective, or legitimate target, two subcategories must
be further characterized: people and places. Deciding if a person is a valid military
objective, there is either a status based or conduct based judgement to be made.160
Through a status based determination, an individual of an armed force “may immediately
be targeted without any specific conduct on his part,”161 because he or she is considered a
lawful combatant and therefore a lawful target.162 Consequently, “attacks against nonmilitary targets,”163 are prohibited. Through a conduct based determination, persons can
become a legitimate military objective by their hostile acts; a belligerent, although not
declared to be with a hostile force, through his or her acts can still be a valid target.164
Invalid military objectives that would not satisfy the military necessity principle, would
include noncombatants: civilians and protected persons, such as prisoners of war, the
wounded and sick, medical personnel, and relief societies.165 It is important to note
however that civilians can become a legitimate target through their conduct, but
noncombatants are invalid military objectives “unless . . . they take direct part in
hostilities.”166
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In further defining places as legitimate military objectives, the distinction comes
down to defended places and undefended places.167 Any place that an enemy force
chooses to defend automatically makes it a military objective.168 Undefended places are
not considered valid military objectives. To be designated as an undefended place, the
site must meet several criteria:
a. all combatants and mobile military equipment are removed;
b. no hostile use made of fixed military installations or establishments;
c. no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population;
and
d. no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken (presence of
enemy medical units, enemy sick and wounded, and enemy police forces are
allowed).169
Other places not identified as military objectives include the natural environment and
protected areas, such as hospitals and safety zones.170 Other protected property includes
civilian, medical, and cultural property.171 However, the “destruction of enemy property
unless demanded by military necessity” is prohibited.172
Distinction
Very similar to military necessity is the principle of distinction, as it refers to
distinguishing between military objectives and non-military objectives. The principle of
distinction “is an expression of concern for the individual victims of the conflict.”173 This
principle is sometimes quoted as the “grandfather of all principles,”174 or “the most basic
and lingering principle,”175 because it provides humanitarian considerations. Distinction
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was first put forth in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which asserts “the only legitimate
object . . . during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”176 This solidifies the
importance of distinguishing between the enemy forces and the civilian population. The
basis of distinction is the idea that all “military attacks should be directed at combatants
and military targets, and not civilians or civilian property.”177 Thus the “parties to a
conflict must direct their operations only against military objectives.”178 The principle of
distinction is quite simple as it purely refers to distinguishing between military objectives
and non-military objectives (i.e. combatants versus civilians). For example, in Geneva
Protocol I, Article 48, “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”179 Thus it
requires forces to have a distinct and valid target before engaging. In other words, forces
cannot blindly or indiscriminately engage anyone they see without first distinguishing if a
target is a valid military objective. This distinction between civilian objects and military
objectives is not only depicted in LOAC, but also in an abundance of military manuals.180
Civilians are protected from indiscriminate attacks,181 and such attacks “include
those where the incidental loss of civilian life, or damage to civilian object, would be
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excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”182 Further
defined in Geneva Protocol I, Article 51(4), indiscriminate attacks are:
“(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at
a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of
a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.”183
Therefore, under Geneva Protocol I, Article 51(4)(a), indiscriminate attacks are not
characterized under the distinction principle because the estimated objectives do not
possess a specific, or distinct, target.
Proportionality
Additionally, under Geneva Protocol 1, Article 51, indiscriminate attacks are
further evaluated and the principle of proportionality is introduced in Article 51(5)(b):
“(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”184
The key word is “excessive,” as it refers to the proportionality test. It is important to note
that the principle of proportionality only pertains to military objectives that may affect
civilians; “the principle is only applicable when an attack has the possibility of affecting
civilians. If the target is purely military with no known civilian personnel or property in
the vicinity, no proportionality analysis need be conducted.”185 Yet, the principle is
highly relevant when judging military objectives and the military necessity, because in
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war, the proportionality principle requires that the acts of military parties must be
conducted in a way that are proportional to the desired outcomes.186 Simply put, “the rule
of proportionality provides that ‘loss of life and damage to property must not be out of
proportion to the military advantage gained.’”187
When the proportionality test “is applied to the use of weapons in the field, it
appears to impose an obligation on the military commander to select only those weapons
available that are reasonably likely to achieve a specific military objective while limiting
collateral damage to nonmilitary targets.”188 The “incidental loss of civilian life”189 is an
accepted risk that military personnel must consider when attacking an objective, and is
not a violation of LOAC.190 The law recognizes this risk, but also requires “the
commander to weigh the expected death, injury, and destruction against the military
advantage anticipated.”191 Thus, the proportionality analysis comes into play when the
expected death, injury, or destruction is excessive in nature to the expected military
advantage.192 In weighing the outcomes, it is important to note that the analysis is not if
any death, injury, or destruction will occur as a result of the attack, but how excessive the
death, injury, or destruction might be.193 Essentially, the proportionality test weighs the
needs of war and humanitarian requirements,194 while the outcome must always be that
the military advantage achieved “outweighed the civilian casualties.”195
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The principle of proportionality clearly places an extensive burden on the judging
commander to act reasonably at the time of the analysis.196 For example, the Department
of the Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, para. 41 states
“Those who plan or decide upon an attack, therefore, must take all reasonable
steps to ensure not only that the objectives are identified as military objectives or
defended places within the meaning of the preceding paragraph but also that these
objectives may be attacked without probable losses in lives and damage to
property disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated.”197
Therefore, in the proportionality analysis, commanders are required to weigh the risks of
not only the civilian loss, but also the possible harm to protected places or property
against the success of the military advantage.198 In order to move forward, there must be
a reasonable ratio within the analysis.199 The term “reasonable” becomes very relevant
and important in determining if the commander did act in the appropriate context; “the
question of reasonableness . . . ensures an objective standard must be met as well.”200
First, did the commander have a reasonable amount of information before deciding? 201
Second, based on that intelligence, did the commander ultimately act reasonably? 202
However, the fact that the commander did not know a crucial piece of information at the
time of the decision, cannot be held against him or her if, based on the information at
hand, the commander acted reasonably. For example, in Desert Storm, a bunker seen as a
military objective was attacked and ultimately civilian lives were lost,203 yet based on the
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assessment of the objective, the bunker was a reasonable military target and the
“incidental damage would not outweigh the military advantage gained.”204
Unnecessary Suffering
Directly related to proportionality and military necessity and further linked to the
use of certain weaponry, is the principle of unnecessary suffering.205 Under the 1907
Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 23(e), it is
forbidden “to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering.”206 This principle is aimed at prohibiting both the use of weapons that by
nature cause unnecessary suffering and weapons in the manner used cause unnecessary
suffering.207 Banning weapons that inherently cause unnecessary suffering is rooted in the
history of LOAC; first found in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, and reiterated in
the Final Protocol of 1874, the Laws of War on Land in 1880, and again solidified in
Hague Convention II of 1899.208 The term unnecessary “refers not to the suffering
actually endured by an individual, but to suffering which is beyond that essential for the
achievement of the purpose for which it has been inflicted, that is to say, suffering which
goes beyond the mere disabling of the victim.”209 In other words, the suffering that is
disproportionate to the military advantage. Therefore, this directly relates back to the
proportionality of the unnecessary suffering and the military necessity. Together, the
weight and strength of these four fundamental principles lies “in the fact that they had
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been invoked as authority in several international agreements that banned use of
specifically identified weapons.”210
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CHAPTER FOUR
Discussion: Applying the Law to the Principles
The principles of LOAC were imbedded in CCW Protocol II, Article 3 as it
included “prohibitions against directing weapons against civilian populations,
indiscriminate use of weapons, and disproportionate harm to civilians.”211 Yet, as CCW
Protocol II directly relates its attempt at arms control to the principles of LOAC, CCW
Protocol II is “a combination of exceptions, limitations, loop-holes, and admonitory . . .
clauses render[ing] this treaty ineffective.”212 CCW Protocol II “defers to military
interests and neglects the concern against harm to civilians.”213 For example, the
restrictions on landmines in CCW Protocol II are undermined by several of the articles,
which ultimately make the protocol inadequate in arms control.214 For instance, Articles 4
and 5 restrict the use of landmines but ultimately provide ways around the restrictions
and therefore this exclusion “is virtually consumed by these exceptions.”215 Under Article
6, the use of remotely-delivered mines is further mandated, but still very loosely, which
allows for parties to navigate around the restrictions.216 The article requires warning to
civilians in certain situations, but gives way to the obligatory warning requirements if the
circumstances simply do not permit.217 Ultimately, one of the largest restrictions of CCW
Protocol II is that it only applies to conflicts of international character.218
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However, under LOAC Chapter 29, Rule 81, the use of landmines is restricted
and specifically states “When landmines are used, particular care must be taken to
minimize their indiscriminate effects.”219 This rule applies to all international and noninternational armed conflicts, and applies to anti-personnel landmines.220 But, as seen in
CCW Protocol II, it overwhelmingly “defers to military interests and neglects the concern
against harm to civilians,”221 which in turn negates the LOAC intent to limit
indiscriminate damage. Regardless of the loopholes in CCW Protocol II allowing military
necessity to override the restrictions on landmines, the U.S. still held reservations. As a
result of CCW Protocol II’s lack of impact on the global community’s use of landmines,
the MBT derives as a measure to ensure that state parties will adhere to the fundamental
principles of LOAC.222 CCW Protocol II had little effect on the international
humanitarian crisis as a result of landmines, and in response to the international outcry of
the unnecessary suffering, the MBT entered into effect to close the gaps of CCW
Protocol II. The MBT places a significant importance on humanitarian considerations
because “such casualties conflict with well-established doctrines” of LOAC.223
Landmines cause unnecessary suffering. The purpose of a landmine is inherently
to kill or wound an individual, and consequently landmines “pose such a threat to noncombatants that these weapons may violate principles” of LOAC.224 Landmines “can
cause unintended, yet extremely injurious, effects on non-combatants”225 and a victim of
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a landmine explosion endures unspeakable pain as the “explosions from land mines sever
limbs, produce paralysis, cause blindness, and sometimes drive their victims into
irreversible psychosis.”226 Upon coming into contact with a landmine, depending on the
proximity, there are three common outcomes for the individual.227 The first: “Traumatic
or surgical amputation of one or both lower limbs usually occurs from standing on a
buried mine which detonates.”228 Second, mines set off nearby may cause “random,
penetrating injuries, often including injuries to the head, neck, chest, and abdomen, and
injuries that may also require surgical amputation of limbs.”229 And lastly, from handling
mines, injuries to the face and arms are common.230 More importantly, “Blindness and
other eye injuries will often result from all three of these experiences.”231 Obviously
landmines “produce fatal injuries, and the resulting death may be torturous and
prolonged,”232 and therefore the prevailing outcome of landmines can be characterized as
unnecessary suffering under the terms of LOAC. As set in precedent, “Inflicting
unnecessary suffering upon persons has long been recognized as a breach” of the
LOAC.233
To override the principle of unnecessary suffering, some rely on the principles of
military necessity and proportionality to advocate for the use of landmines.234 However,
use of landmines is not militarily necessary in today’s warfare, nor does the weapon offer
a military advantage. The intent of war is to weaken the other armed force, but “only such
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destruction [is authorized] as is necessary, relevant, and proportionate to the prompt
realization of legitimate belligerent objectives.”235 First on military necessity, landmines
have been historically referred to for their use “as tactical defensive weapons with the
primary purpose of channeling enemy forces into more easily-defended areas, denying to
the enemy positions that could not be covered by friendly troops, and protecting friendly
troops.”236 However, it has been repeatedly cited by high ranking military officials that
the use of landmines does not help further the military objective, therefore making
landmines unnecessary and irrelevant to the military objective.237 In 1993, a “former
Marine Corps Commandant, General Alfred Gray, Jr., stated that he knew of no situation
in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, or the Gulf War where mine warfare effectively channeled
the enemy and brought them into a destructible pattern,”238 thus rendering landmines
useless. Landmines are also a very difficult weapon to employ responsibly in a combat
situation, where they would ideally be most useful.239 A former U.S. Secretary cited
instances where “land mines killed one-fifth to one-third of all American soldiers in
Vietnam, while relatively few enemy troops were killed or disabled by these weapons.”240
Furthermore, General Gray admitted that “he was not aware of any operational advantage
from widespread deployment of mines and cited many examples where American
soldiers were trapped in their own mine fields.”241 A U.S. Army report, also cited mines
as “the biggest single cause of friendly-fire deaths during mock battles . . . against a less
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sophisticated enemy . . . forty-five were victims of their own mines.”242 The U.S.
Commander in South Korea, Lieutenant General James Hollingsworth called landmines
“a nuisance”243 and said they were essentially ineffective and did not play a role in an
active war.244 Clearly, there is no strong military advantage in the use of landmines.
The military advantage gained from the use of landmines in not proportionate to
the amount of unnecessary suffering caused. Under the principle of proportionality, the
unnecessary suffering must not be excessive in proportion to the military advantage
gained.245 “The military utility of mines must be measured not merely in terms of their
effect on the balance of military strength, but also on their capacity to inflict grief and
pain on soldiers and civilians alike.”246 As seen above, the lack of military advantage
does not outweigh the predicted unnecessary
suffering inflicted on the victims. The use of
landmines conflicts “with the foregoing
requirements to minimize harm to civilians
from military operations.”247 For example, as
previously discussed, landmines “kill many
more civilians than soldiers, often long after
conflicts have ended.”248 (See Figure 3).
Figure 3249
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Furthermore, landmines are “one of the most significant dangers to the deployment of
peacekeeping missions: 42 peacekeepers (civilians) were killed and 315 injured by
landmines during the UN peacekeeping operation in former Yugoslavia.”250 This is
evidence that the use of landmines is conflicting with the requirement to minimize harm
to the civilian population when, as noted above, the military advantage and military
necessity to use landmines was not very compelling in the first place. Consequently, after
analyzing the use of landmines, one can conclude that the use “is inconsistent with the
goals of minimizing harm to civilians”251 when weighed against the military necessity
and therefore does not satisfy the principle of proportionality.
Based upon the discussion of the military necessity and proportionality above, one
can see that land mines act randomly and thus have no discriminating factor. Landmines
fail the test of distinction. As military commanders have noted, the use of landmines have
proved to be insufficient, combat ineffective, and simply more trouble than they are
worth as they have killed more American troops than they have the enemy.252 The
staggering amount of civilians affected by the deployment of landmines is evidence that
the weapon does not have any discriminatory capabilities, as they “are among the real
weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction.”253 A landmine, by nature, “cannot tell
if it is being triggered by an enemy combatant or a member of the civilian population.”254
Landmines are also often delivered by aircraft or artillery, which inherently gives forces
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less control over the placement of landmines as they are not placed by hand.255
Consequently, this does not allow for the mine locations to be accurately identified or
recorded.256 Commentators have noted that “the prohibition of weapons and tactics that
cause indiscriminate harm between combatants and non-combatants is a ‘core rule’
derived”257 from LOAC. Congress has also “found that land mines ‘have been used
indiscriminately in dramatically increasing numbers’ and that ‘[n]oncombatant civilians,
including tens of thousands of children, have been the primary victims.’”258 The inability
to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and their inaccurate placement
“establishes the indiscriminate nature of land mine deployment,”259 and therefore does
not satisfy the principle of distinction.
As seen above, the overwhelming number of civilian victims causes the use of
landmines to “fail the double test of discrimination between combatants and civilians and
[the] balance between military necessity and proportionality.”260 The same overwhelming
statistics were the driving force behind the inception of the MBT. Falling under LOAC,
the MBT was the legal strength that the international community needed to fill in the
legal gaps of CCW Protocol II; the MBT banned the use of a fundamentally illegal
weapon. In initiating the process, “The alliance of the professional authority of ICRC
surgeons and senior military experts was very effective in compelling governments to
weigh military necessity against humanitarian consequences in a manner and to an extent
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without precedent.”261 Yet, apart from the majority of its alliances, the U.S. failed to
become a signing party to the MBT.
Specifically pertaining to the U.S.’s failure to sign the MBT, one can speculate
that particular Articles might have influenced the decision. For example, Article 3 of the
MBT outlines the exception of using landmines for “the retention or transfer of a number
of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine
clearance, or mine destruction techniques,”262 and Article 4 outlines the deadline for a
party to destroy all anti-personnel mines, which must be no later than four years after the
party’s entry into the MBT.263 The U.S., in 2014, still held 3 million landmines in reserve
in case of a conflict between North and South Korea, even though General Hollingsworth
questions the military utility of landmines in such an instance.264 Notably, the U.S.
continues to maintain its stockpile even though “[t]he Pentagon has not used land mines
broadly since the first Gulf War in 1991, and stopped producing them in 1997.”265 But
perhaps the most detrimental or most plausible language within the MBT as to why the
U.S. has not become a signing party is the language of Article 20 (cited in section II),
which outlines the withdrawal guidelines. The Article requires any state party, if engaged
in a war within six months of the party’s withdrawal, to be bound by the legal limits
outlined within the MBT.266 This language legally binds the U.S. to the MBT if they
wanted to withdraw in anticipation of a Korean conflict, that is, if the U.S. did not meet
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the six-month requirement; this reluctance to sign is flawed, however, as the military
necessity of such a weapon has been deemed irrelevant to that particular conflict.267
The U.S. has repeatedly cited that the military necessity of the use of landmines in
Korea as one of their predominant reasons for not joining the MBT.268 But General
Hollingsworth continually disputes the military utility of landmines in such a conflict. 269
Yet, the Pentagon stands by its decision to not join the MBT as the U.S. “must maintain
the option to disperse antipersonnel landmines if North Korean troops advance on the
South.”270 They argue that landmines are needed to channel the enemy,271 yet as argued
above, this is not practical or effective. The argument for the use of landmines in Korea is
further flawed because the Pentagon bases this of “computer-stimulated war-games.”272
In committing themselves to not deploy landmines outside of Korea after 2003,273 the
U.S. simultaneously then admits to the international world that they agree with the MBT,
except for their own personal and advantageous use; “the U.S. signals to every other
country that the weapon’s military utility outweighs its humanitarian costs.”274 Other
countries (i.e. Finland in regard to Russia) have come to terms with the fact that
landmines “were either not essential to their [defense] or that the [defense] risks were
outweighed by the humanitarian benefits.”275 Further diminishing the U.S.’s firm
standpoint, is the fact that “a North Korean regime crazy and determined enough to
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invade the South could simply come through the minefields and accept a level of
casualties.”276 The U.S.’s argument of military necessity is extremely defective from
variety of angles that do not justify for the country’s failure to become a signatory party.
Most importantly, “The few hours’ worth of delay [that the landmines would potentially
have in a Korean conflict] is too high a price for the savagery and destruction being
caused by landmines among civilians on a daily basis.”277
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion
Prior to the MBT, the Department of Defense released a report stating, “the U.S.
military is committed to “achieving a global ban as soon as possible” and that the
Department of Defense was engaged in an “aggressive . . . program to provide effective
[anti-personnel landmine] alternatives.””278 On the forefront of the political campaign to
ban landmines in the U.S. was Senator Patrick Leahy as he “sponsored an amendment
prohibiting the U.S. exports of anti-personnel landmines, which became permanent U.S.
policy in 1997.”279 Around the same time, President Bill Clinton declared that the U.S.
“would ‘lead a global effort to eliminate [anti-personnel landmines] and to stop the
enormous loss of human life.’”280 Yet, the U.S. failed to even sign the treaty. During the
drafting of the MBT, the White House released a statement holding the U.S. accountable
– “by 2003 we will no longer use anti-personnel landmines outside Korea, and, within
Korea, our objective is to have alternatives to anti-personnel landmines ready by
2006.”281 The U.S. followed through on their first statement, yet has done nothing to date
to even show an attempt to finding alternatives.282 Within the first two years of the
statement, the follow on efforts in search of alternatives produced technologies that did
not even comply with the MBT.283 In 2004, President George W. Bush put into effect a
new public policy that was inconsistent with the MBT. 284 Under the new policy, the U.S.

278

Briggs, 2.
Ibid, 1.
280
Ibid, 1.
281
Ibid, 2.
282
Burkhalter.
283
Burkhalter.
284
Good, 2.
279

43

will cease using persistent landmines, but will “continue to use mines with self-destruct
or deactivate mechanisms.”285 These technologies are engineered to make the landmines
short-lived but do not prevent the weapon from maiming innocent victims.286 In fact, the
technology is not 100 percent reliable and has been proven to be more costly to the
demining efforts; civilians still “face the danger not only of accidentally detonating mines
that have failed to self-destruct, but of coming upon hundreds of those mines randomly
self-destructing at unknown times.”287 Therefore these additional technologies do nothing
to combat the indiscriminate nature of landmines that continue to cause the unnecessary
suffering of thousands of victims.
The U.S. attempted to implement a landmine that “can be command-detonated
once the target has been identified as a combatant. However, the device could include a
‘battlefield override’ feature.”288 This feature took the human determination out of the
scenario and allows the landmine to “automatically detonate the minefield if the
command center is overrun by enemy soldiers,”289 or other individuals. Therefore, the
feature makes the new “system indiscriminate and thus illegal under the treaty.”290 When
President Barack Obama came into office in 2009, he kept this policy in place.291
Regardless of the lack of action the executive branch, Senator Leahy held U.S. to its
promise and campaigned for amendments that would fund the research to find
alternatives as well as help the humanitarian effort.292 To date, “the United States has
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contributed over $1.3 billion since 1993 to clear mines and aid victims of landmines.”293
But regardless of the financial efforts put forth by a government not in compliance with
the MBT, the U.S. simply undermines their “political commitment to ending their use,”294
and displays a lack of leadership within the international community.295 Merely
“[t]hrowing money at the problem is not enough;”296 the U.S.’s own failure to sign the
MBT categorizes itself as a “rogue state”297 not in compliance with LOAC.
The U.S. continually cites the need for the landmines in a potential Korean
conflict as well as the change in the definition of an anti-personnel landmine to include
the U.S.’s mixed systems.298 These exceptions would ultimately make the MBT as
ineffective as CCW Protocol II in restricting and/or banning the use of landmines because
the changes the U.S. wanted “would have created a loophole big enough ‘to drive a tank
through.’”299 The negotiators of the MBT were right to hold their ground as
“[a]ntipersonnel landmines are not a weapon to be regulated and tolerated but one to be
anathematized and renounced.”300 The MBT is not a source of regulations, but rather a
rejection of a “particular weapon – indiscriminate, and a source of unnecessary suffering
and superfluous injury.”301 If the military advantage “is less than the casualties inflicted
on innocent civilians that can reasonably be predicted in advance,”302 the use of such

Lt. General Robert G. Gard Jr., “Past Time to Join the Landmine Treaty,” Huffington Post, (2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lt-general-robert-g-gard-jr-/past-time-to-join-the-lan_b_176335.html,
(accessed March 2018).
294
Ibid.
295
Lesley Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm
Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty,” Arizona Journal of
International and Comparative Law, (2003), 6.
296
Emmons.
297
Anderson, 96.
298
Thakur & Maley, 289.
299
Ibid, 289.
300
Ibid, 295.
301
Ibid, 294.
302
Ibid, 296.
293

45

weapon is prohibited under the core principles of LOAC. A landmine “is not a weapon
that respects a cease-fire and it is indifferent to the distinction between civilians and
soldiers;”303 it is a weapon “designed to inflict particularly horrific injuries on their
victims.”304 Landmines are “the weapon of mass murder in slow motion,”305 as they have
killed more people than nuclear or chemical weapons have killed combined.306 Based
upon the compelling evidence that anti-personnel landmines violate the four core
principles, the use of such weapon is in violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict. The
1997 Mine Ban Treaty prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of an
inherently illegal weapon signifies the majority of the international community’s
commitment to not use landmines. The United States’ reluctance to sign the treaty
discredits the country’s authority and credibility, as they are considered a rogue state.
The U.S. displayed a blatant disregard for LOAC307 when it decided not to sign
the MBT. “Generally, a weapon was banned as inconsistent with one or more of the
following: (1) its use was calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; (2) it was
indiscriminate, i.e. it affected combatants and civilians alike; (3) it was deemed to be
treacherous.”308 Landmines are inconsistent with all three of the criteria “because 80 to
90 percent of the victims are civilian; because injuries inflicted by landmines are of a
horrific nature; and because landmines continue to cause death and injury for decades
after being sown.”309 Landmines automatically fail the test of distinction and unnecessary
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suffering, while the military necessity of landmines is “highly questionable.”310
Landmines may have impacted minor scuffles, but have never affected “the course of a
battle, let alone a war;”311 thus landmines fail the test of military necessity and the test of
proportionality – the utility of the weapon does not outweigh the obvious unnecessary
suffering. The “prohibition and elimination [of landmines] should be pursued as a matter
of utmost urgency by governments and the entire international community,”312 to ban an
entire class of weapons that violate the four principles of LOAC. The MBT is
“[d]etermined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless
[defenseless] civilians and especially children.”313 With an outright refusal to sign the
1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the United States believes it does not have to play by the rules.
As a failure to the greater international community by not becoming a signatory party, the
United States should sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty as it bans an inherently illegal
weapon under the Laws of Armed Conflict. The United States’ is in violation of the Laws
of Armed Conflict by its willingness to use landmines. Without its signature, the United
States continues to be a victim of their own reluctance.
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